Complaint against GBC, Facts and Grounds

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Statement of Facts


The Claimant has a hackney carriage vehicle license (the License) (Please see page 26) issued by the Defendant on 1st June 2017, license number 68 on Ford Mondeo YT63UVU.

A revised License was issued on 25th September 2017 (Pages 37 and 38)

On the 3rd January 2018 at 13.45 a notice number 152 (Please see page 32) was served on me by Mr Mark Adams a Licensing Officer from the Defendant, purporting to suspend the license for:

1 Breach of a purported licence condition that the vehicle be liveried

2 That my Meter/ Fare Chart was DEC 2013

The Claimant applied on the 3rd January 2018 to Guildford Magistrates Court under section 47 of the Local Government Miscellaneous Provisions Act (Page 135) to appeal against the livery condition on the license.

A Summons for this purpose was served on the Defendant on the 12th February 2018. (Page 64)

I believe that the facts stated in this claim form and statement of facts and grounds are true.

Signed [[Image:]]

Mark Guy Rostron


Statement of Grounds


Contents

Failure to give proper notice of the livery license condition

The Defendant’s decision to suspend and revoke under section 68 was unlawful in that the licence condition had not been stipulated on a properly formed license.

There are strict rules on the giving of the Statutory notice required, set out in section 300 of the Public Health Act 1936 (PHA) (see page 147)

300Appeals and applications to courts of summary jurisdiction.

(1) Where any enactment in this Act provides—

(a)for an appeal to a court of summary jurisdiction against a requirement, refusal or other decision of a council; or

(b) for any matter to be determined by, or an application in respect of any matter to be made to, a court of summary jurisdiction,

the procedure shall be by way of complaint for an order, and the Summary Jurisdiction Acts shall apply to the proceedings.

(2) The time within which any such appeal may be brought shall be twenty-one days from the date on which notice of the council’s requirement, refusal or other decision was served upon the person desiring to appeal, and for the purposes of this subsection the making of the complaint shall be deemed to be the bringing of the appeal.

(3) In any case where such an appeal lies, the document notifying to the person concerned the decision of the council in the matter shall state the right of appeal to a court of summary jurisdiction and the time within which such an appeal may be brought.

The strict application of that section were decided in Stockton-On-Tees Borough Council v Latif [2009] EWHC 228 (Admin) (13 February 2009) (See page 195)


The terms of the section 300 of the Public Health Act 1936 are, in my view clear. A fixed period of 21 days is given to bring an appeal. Parliament did not provide for an extension of time which it clearly could have done if that had been the intention. In addition Parliament made it mandatory that the document notifying the person of the decision should state the right of appeal and the time within which such an appeal might be brought. That, it seems to me, is a pointer to the importance of compliance with the time limit and would militate against any implied right of extending the time.


The hackney carriage license condition is void or voidable

……Lord Somervell of Harrow put it, at p. 104:

"Is a man to be sent to prison on the basis that an order is a good order when the court knows it would be set aside if proper proceedings were taken? I doubt it."

Viscount Simonds, at p. 98, Lord Reid, at p. 98 and Lord Tucker, at pp. 103-104, agreed with these views. In my judgment the answer to Lord Somervell's question must be "No." It would be a fundamental departure from the rule of law if an individual were liable to conviction for contravention of some rule which is itself liable to be set aside by a court as unlawful. Suppose an individual is charged before one court with breach of a byelaw and the next day another court quashes that byelaw--for example, because it was promulgated by a public body which did not take account of a relevant consideration. Any system of law under which the individual was convicted and made subject to a criminal penalty for breach of an unlawful byelaw would be inconsistent with the rule of law.

………But in 1969, the decision of your Lordships House in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 made obsolete the historic distinction between errors of law on the face of the record and other errors of law. It did so by extending the doctrine of ultra vires, so that any misdirection in law would render the relevant decision ultra vires and a nullity….. Boddington v. British Transport Police [1998] UKHL 13; [1999] 2 AC 143; [1998] 2 All ER 203; [1998] 2 WLR 639 (2nd April, 1998)


Unenforceability of livery license condition due to lack of proper notice

Alternatively, the Defendant cannot enforce the livery licence condition, as to enforce a condition without right of appeal as a result of the lack of proper statutory notice would be a breach of natural justice and Wednesbury unreasonable.

The hackney carriage vehicle license suspension was ultra vires the Officers authority

The Defendant Council Policy (page 47) is that the license can only be suspended or revoked if the vehicle is a danger to the public, or the meter faulty. Neither of those criteria applied to this vehicle.

Suspending or revoking a licence (vehicles)

11.11 We will suspend your vehicle licence where we have reasonable grounds to suspect that the condition of the vehicle is dangerous and poses a risk to passengers or other road users. For example, there is damage to the vehicle, the tyre tread is insufficient, the vehicle has been involved in a collision, or is the insurance is no longer valid.

11.12 We may suspend your licence in addition to requiring you to have the vehicle tested as described above.

11.13 We will lift the suspension once we are satisfied that the condition of the taxi or private hire vehicle no longer poses an immediate danger to passengers or other road users.

11.14 We may revoke your licence in circumstances where it is dangerous and poses a risk to passengers or other road users and suspension of the licence is not appropriate. For example, if there is no reasonable prospect of repairing the damage, such as an accident write-off.

The Defendant’s Officer found no mechanical faults that made the vehicle unfit within the meaning of section 68 of the LGMPA or for the purposes of the Defendants hackney carriage vehicle license enforcement policy. (see Notice page )

The meter had been properly calibrated in December 2013 when the vehicle was first licensed. The Officer did not ask me when the fare chart had last been updated, but it had been updated on Friday 22nd December 2017 as required by Guildford Borough Council and as notified and acknowledged by you.

Suspension of the hackney carriage vehicle license is a disproportionate action

The Defendant’s Council Taxi Policy (see page 126)says:

11.2 We will follow the Regulators Code and the Health and Community Care Enforcement Policy and will base any enforcement action on the seriousness of the breach and the possible consequences arising from it. We will not take enforcement action as a punitive response to minor technical contraventions of legislation or licence conditions.

11.3 We may use ‘mystery shoppers’ to test compliance with the law and taxi and private hire licence conditions.

11.4 We aim to achieve and maintain a consistent approach when we make our decisions.

In reaching any decision we will consider the following criteria:

a) seriousness of any offences or breach of conditions

b) driver or operator’s past history

c) consequence(s) of non-compliance

d) likely effectiveness of the various enforcement options

e) danger to the public


As there is no risk to any members of the public from the use, suspension is disproportionate and is contrary to the Respondent’s enforcement policy

Suspension or revocation breaches claimants Human Rights

    1. = Immediate suspension and subsequent revocation by the Defendant breaches my Human Right to the quiet enjoyment of my property. Part 2 Protocol 1, Article, 1, (Page 168) by unlawfully preventing me from using my hackney carriage. =
    1. Immediate suspension and subsequent revocation bt the Defendant breaches my rights in Article 6 (Page 169) that in the determination of the Claimant’s civil rights and obligations he is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, by
      1. denying me my right of appeal under s47 of the LGMPA, and
      2. enforcing a license condition which is likely to be found unlawful by the Court of Appeal.
    2. Several of the Defendant’s Officers involved in the suspension of the Claimant’s hackney carriage vehicle license are named in information for applications for Magistrates Court Summons in respect of fraud and two Court of Appeal applications for 48 items of fraud in the matter of the livery (see pages 71 to 79), and 29 offences of fraud in the matter of the Guildford taxi fare calculation (see page 70). It is a breach of my Human Rights to have licensing and legal and other decisions in connection with this case made by parties who are themselves are aware they are subject to allegations of very serious criminal offences in connection with the licencing regime for hackney carriages in Guildford.

In Magill v. Weeks [2001] UKHL 67 (13th December, 2001), Lord Hope of Craighead approved the Court of Appeal in In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700, where Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR, giving the judgment of the court, observed, at p 711 A-B, that the precise test to be applied when determining whether a decision should be set aside on account of bias is:


The court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It must then ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility, or a real danger, the two being the same, that the tribunal was biased."


It is clearly unfair that Officers of the Defendant should be able to make an unappealable decision in those circumstances.

Abuse of process

That the use by the Defendant of section 68 (see page 140) which gives no right of appeal as opposed to section 60 (see page 139) which does is a deliberate abuse of process to attempt to deprive me of any right of appeal for over two months when a suspension giving a right to immediate appeal was available to the Defendant under s60. The abusive choice of the punitive section 68 was Wednesbury unreasonable.

Suspension for non vehicle safety unfitness under s 68 is ultra vires

Section 68 of the LGMPA is entitled “Fitness of hackney carriages and private hire vehicles”, is for suspension or revocation due to the vehicle not being fit as a vehicle. The section is based on the Plymouth Corporation Act of 1975, and the title of section 26 (see page 246) of the Plymouth Corporation Act 1975 is exactly the same.

Section 60 LGMPA entitled “Suspension and revocation of vehicle licences”, is for suspension or revocation due to the vehicle not being fit as a hackney carriage, not just as a vehicle. The section is based on the Plymouth Corporation Act of 1975, and the title of section 26 of the Plymouth Corporation Act 1975 is exactly the same.

The difference between the two sections is that s68 is about fitness as a vehicle, and s60 is about fitness as a hackney carriage. So, while the fitness part is the same, the two sections apply the test to two different objects, the vehicles or the hackney carriage.

The true use of section 68 of the LGMPA is set out in the Plymouth City Council policy (see page 247):

7.4 Where an officer of the Council has reasonable grounds to suspect that the condition of the vehicle poses a danger to either passengers or other members of the public, he/she may serve on the driver / proprietor a vehicle defect notice. In such cases the vehicle licence shall immediately be suspended, until such time as the defect(s) have been remedied. The suspension shall not be lifted until it is proved to the authorised officer that the vehicle defect has been corrected. The defect notice may require the vehicle to be tested at an approved Council appointed testing station, at the proprietor’s expense.

It is clear from Plymouth’s implementation of their sections 18 (see Page 246) and 26 that the two sections are for different purposes and that is why they are not consolidated and that is why the wording is different.

Section 68 LGMPA is only for when the vehicle is unfit in the sense that it is a danger to the passengers or the public.


Right of Appeal under section 47 of the Local Government Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1976

The Claimant should have had a right of immediate appeal under s47 on the Act (page 135) and further should have been allowed by s77 LGMPA (see page 142) to continue working until the determination of that appeal.

Law of reasonable expectation

The Claimant had the reasonable expectation that his right of appeal against any purported license condition would still be available or that he would not be prejudiced by any lack of it following the letter of John Martin (see pages 34 to 36) in response to the Claimants complaint to the Defendant (see page 45).

Secondly, the Claimant had the reasonable expectation that the Defendant’s Officers would follow Council policy, and only suspend or revoke if the vehicle was a danger to the public, which it is not. See defendant’s defect notice of (Page 32) which does not note any safety defects for the vehicle. Further, as the Defendant had neglected to include the effect of section 21 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act, that:

Principles

(1)Any person exercising a regulatory function to which this section applies must have regard to the principles in subsection (2) in the exercise of the function.

(2)Those principles are that—

(a)regulatory activities should be carried out in a way which is transparent, accountable, proportionate and consistent;

(b)regulatory activities should be targeted only at cases in which action is needed.

(3)The duty in subsection (1) is subject to any other requirement affecting the exercise of the regulatory function.

Further the Defendant has failed for 12 years to have regard to the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act or the consequent Regulators Code of 2014 (See pages 170 to 190). It being only at their meeting on the 2nd January 2018 where Defendant first voted to adopt those provisions.

The Defendant’s current published enforcement policy for taxis was not amended by the 3rd or 4th January 2018 when notices of suspension were served on the Claimant. In fact the latest version of the PDF file for the policy says it was created and last amended on the 24th December 2015. In fact it includes text (11.2 We will follow the Regulators Code…. See page 126) which was only inserted into after the Council adopted the provisions on 2nd January 2018.

It is unlikely that the Defendant’s Officers had time to be trained on the new policy between 19:00 hours on the 2rd January 2018 and 13:00 hours on the 3rd January 2018 when the first Notice of Suspension was served (see page 32)


The Claimant has a right to continue using his hackney carriage until the Magistrates Courts appeal is disposed of

Section 77 of the LGMPA Act (see page 142) says

(2) If any requirement, refusal or other decision of a district council against which a right of appeal is conferred by this Act—

(a) involves the execution of any work or the taking of any action; or

(b) makes it unlawful for any person to carry on a business which he was lawfully carrying on up to the time of the requirement, refusal or decision;

then, until the time for appealing has expired, or, when an appeal is lodged, until the appeal is disposed of or withdrawn or fails for want of prosecution—

(i) no proceedings shall be taken in respect of any failure to execute the work, or take the action; and

(ii) that person may carry on that business.

As the purported hackney carriage vehicle suspension and any subsequent revocation by the Defendant of the License is unlawful and ultra vires and without proper notice the Court should order the Defendant to allow the Claimant to use his hackney carriage, and without fear of the kind of reprisals by the Defendant set out in Mike Smith’s letter of 4th January 2018 (Paragraphs 4 to 6 of Page 31) in the form of their suggested attack on his personal hackney carriage driver’s license, and other penalties, till an appeal under section 47 of the LGMP Act is decided.

I believe that the facts stated in this claim form and statement of facts and grounds are true.

Signed [[Image:]]


Mark Guy Rostron

Draft Order


ORDER

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE Claim No.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Before The Honourable

Dated

Applicant: Mark Guy Rostron

Seal


Respondent: Guildford Borough Council, Millmead House, Millmead, Guildford, Surrey

GU2 4BB

Direct Telephone Number: 01483 505050 eMail: customerservices@guildford.gov.uk

THIS ORDER

  1. This is an Order to Stay the Defendants suspension or revocation of the Claimant’s hackney carriage license, and
  2. To Order the Defendant to return the Claimant’s hackney carriage plate 68, and
  3. To Quash the Defendant’s decision to suspend or revoke the Claimant’s hackney carriage vehicle license.

made against the Respondent on [ ] by Mr Justice [ ] on the application of the Applicant.

2. This Order has effect until withdrawn by this Court.

3. This order was made on application by the Applicant without notice to the Respondent. The Respondent has a right to apply to the court to vary or discharge the order.

4. This order is effective against any Respondent on whom it is served or who is given notice of it.


[[Image:]][[Image:]]Draft Statement of Facts


The Claimant has a hackney carriage vehicle license (Page ) issued by the Defendant on 1st June 2017, license number 68 on Ford Mondeo YT63UVU.

On the 3rd January 2018 at 13.45 a notice number 152 (Please see page ) was served on me by Mr Mark Adams a Licensing Officer from the Defendant, purporting to suspend the license for:

1 Breach of a purported licence condition that the vehicle be liveried

2 That my Meter/ Fare Chart was DEC 2013

The Claimant applied on the 3rd January 2018 to Guildford Magistrates Court under section 47 of the Local Government Miscellaneous Provisions Act (Page ) to appeal against the livery condition on the license.

A Summons for this purpose was served on the Defendant on the 12th February 2018.

Further documents regarding the suspension were sent by the Defendant to the Claimant on the 4th January 2018. (Please see pages )

I believe that the facts stated in this claim form and statement of facts and grounds are true.

Signed [[Image:]]

Mark Guy Rostron


Draft Statement of Grounds

The hackney carriage license condition is void or voidable

……Lord Somervell of Harrow put it, at p. 104:

"Is a man to be sent to prison on the basis that an order is a good order when the court knows it would be set aside if proper proceedings were taken? I doubt it."

Viscount Simonds, at p. 98, Lord Reid, at p. 98 and Lord Tucker, at pp. 103-104, agreed with these views. In my judgment the answer to Lord Somervell's question must be "No." It would be a fundamental departure from the rule of law if an individual were liable to conviction for contravention of some rule which is itself liable to be set aside by a court as unlawful. Suppose an individual is charged before one court with breach of a byelaw and the next day another court quashes that byelaw--for example, because it was promulgated by a public body which did not take account of a relevant consideration. Any system of law under which the individual was convicted and made subject to a criminal penalty for breach of an unlawful byelaw would be inconsistent with the rule of law.

………But in 1969, the decision of your Lordships House in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 made obsolete the historic distinction between errors of law on the face of the record and other errors of law. It did so by extending the doctrine of ultra vires, so that any misdirection in law would render the relevant decision ultra vires and a nullity….. Boddington v. British Transport Police [1998] UKHL 13; [1999] 2 AC 143; [1998] 2 All ER 203; [1998] 2 WLR 639 (2nd April, 1998)

Failure to give proper notice of the livery license condition

There are strict rules on the giving of the Statutory notice required, set out in section 300 of the Public Health Act 1936 (PHA) (see page )

300Appeals and applications to courts of summary jurisdiction.

(1) Where any enactment in this Act provides—

(a)for an appeal to a court of summary jurisdiction against a requirement, refusal or other decision of a council; or

(b) for any matter to be determined by, or an application in respect of any matter to be made to, a court of summary jurisdiction,

the procedure shall be by way of complaint for an order, and the Summary Jurisdiction Acts shall apply to the proceedings.

(2) The time within which any such appeal may be brought shall be twenty-one days from the date on which notice of the council’s requirement, refusal or other decision was served upon the person desiring to appeal, and for the purposes of this subsection the making of the complaint shall be deemed to be the bringing of the appeal.

(3) In any case where such an appeal lies, the document notifying to the person concerned the decision of the council in the matter shall state the right of appeal to a court of summary jurisdiction and the time within which such an appeal may be brought.

The strict application of that section were decided in Stockton-On-Tees Borough Council v Latif [2009] EWHC 228 (Admin) (13 February 2009) (See pages )


The terms of the section 300 of the Public Health Act 1936 are, in my view clear. A fixed period of 21 days is given to bring an appeal. Parliament did not provide for an extension of time which it clearly could have done if that had been the intention. In addition Parliament made it mandatory that the document notifying the person of the decision should state the right of appeal and the time within which such an appeal might be brought. That, it seems to me, is a pointer to the importance of compliance with the time limit and would militate against any implied right of extending the time.


The Claimant cannot be denied an appeal under s47 of the LGMPA if proper notice of time limits was not given to him.

The Officers decision to suspend was unlawful in that the licence condition had not been stipulated on a properly formed license and that if the condition were properly attached to my license then as it came into effect on the 1st January 2018, it would be appealed and that the Claimant would have 21 days under section 47 of the Local Government Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1976 (LGMPA) to appeal it. The Officer was informed of that at the time of the alleged suspension.

Unenforceability of livery license condition due to lack of proper notice

Alternatively, Defendants cannot enforce the livery licence condition, as to enforce a condition without right of appeal as a result of the lack of proper statutory notice would be a breach of natural justice.

The hackney carriage vehicle license suspension was ultra vires the Officers authority

The Council Policy (page ) is that the license can only be suspended or revoked if the vehicle is a danger to the public, or the meter faulty. Neither of those criteria applied to this vehicle.

Suspending or revoking a licence (vehicles)

11.11 We will suspend your vehicle licence where we have reasonable grounds to suspect that the condition of the vehicle is dangerous and poses a risk to passengers or other road users. For example, there is damage to the vehicle, the tyre tread is insufficient, the vehicle has been involved in a collision, or is the insurance is no longer valid.

11.12 We may suspend your licence in addition to requiring you to have the vehicle tested as described above.

11.13 We will lift the suspension once we are satisfied that the condition of the taxi or private hire vehicle no longer poses an immediate danger to passengers or other road users.

11.14 We may revoke your licence in circumstances where it is dangerous and poses a risk to passengers or other road users and suspension of the licence is not appropriate. For example, if there is no reasonable prospect of repairing the damage, such as an accident write-off.

The Officer found no mechanical faults that made the vehicle unfit within the meaning of section 68 of the LGMPA or for the purposes of the Defendants hackney carriage vehicle license enforcement policy. (see Notice page )

The meter had been properly calibrated in December 2013 when the vehicle was first licensed. The Officer did not ask me when the fare chart had last been updated, but it had been updated on Friday 22nd December 2017 as required by Guildford Borough Council and as notified and acknowledged by you.

Suspension of the hackney carriage vehicle license is a disproportionate action

The Council Taxi Policy (see page )says:

11.2 We will follow the Regulators Code and the Health and Community Care Enforcement Policy and will base any enforcement action on the seriousness of the breach and the possible consequences arising from it. We will not take enforcement action as a punitive response to minor technical contraventions of legislation or licence conditions.

11.3 We may use ‘mystery shoppers’ to test compliance with the law and taxi and private hire licence conditions.

11.4 We aim to achieve and maintain a consistent approach when we make our decisions.

In reaching any decision we will consider the following criteria:

a) seriousness of any offences or breach of conditions

b) driver or operator’s past history

c) consequence(s) of non-compliance

d) likely effectiveness of the various enforcement options

e) danger to the public


As there is no risk to any members of the public from the use, suspension is disproportionate and is contrary to the Respondent’s enforcement policy

  1. = Suspension breaches claimants Human Rights =
    1. = Immediate suspension breaches my Human Right to the quiet enjoyment of my property. Part 2 Protocol 1, Article, 1, by unlawfully preventing me from using my hackney carriage. =
    1. Immediate suspension breaches my rights in Article 6 that in the determination of the Claimant’s civil rights and obligations he is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, by
      1. denying me my right of appeal under s47 of the LGMPA, and
      2. enforcing a license condition which is likely to be found unlawful by the Court of Appeal.
    2. Several of the Officers involved in the suspension of the Claimant’s hackney carriage vehicle license are named in information for applications for Magistrates Court Summons in respect of fraud and two Court of Appeal applications for 48 items of fraud in the matter of the livery (see page ), and 29 offences of fraud in the matter of the Guildford taxi fare calculation (see page ). It is a breach of my Human Rights to have licensing and legal and other decisions in connection with this case made by parties who are themselves are aware they are subject to allegations of very serious criminal offences in connection with the licencing regime for hackney carriages in Guildford.

In Magill v. Weeks [2001] UKHL 67 (13th December, 2001), Lord Hope of Craighead approved the Court of Appeal in In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700, where Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR, giving the judgment of the court, observed, at p 711 A-B, that the precise test to be applied when determining whether a decision should be set aside on account of bias is:


The court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It must then ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility, or a real danger, the two being the same, that the tribunal was biased."


It is clearly unfair that Officers of the Defendant should be able to make an unappealable decision in those circumstances.

Abuse of process

That the use of section 68 which gives no right of appeal as opposed to section 60 which does is a deliberate abuse of process to attempt to deprive me of any right of appeal when appeal against suspension was available to the Council under s60.

Right of Appeal under section 47 of the Local Government Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1976

The Claimant nevertheless have such a right of appeal under s47 on the Act and further is allowed by s77 LGMPA (see page ) to continue working until the determination of that appeal.

Law of reasonable expectation

The Claimant had the reasonable expectation that his right of appeal against any purported license condition would still be available or that he would not be prejudiced by any lack of it following the letter of John Martin (see page ) in response to the Claimants complain to the Defendant (see page ).

Secondly, the Claimant had the reasonable expectation that the Defendant’s Officers would follow Council policy, which they did not. Further, as the Defendant had neglected to include the effect of section 21 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act, that:

Principles

(1)Any person exercising a regulatory function to which this section applies must have regard to the principles in subsection (2) in the exercise of the function.

(2)Those principles are that—

(a)regulatory activities should be carried out in a way which is transparent, accountable, proportionate and consistent;

(b)regulatory activities should be targeted only at cases in which action is needed.

(3)The duty in subsection (1) is subject to any other requirement affecting the exercise of the regulatory function.

Further the Defendant has failed for 12 years to have regard to the Act or the following Regulators Code of 2014. It being only at their meeting on the 2nd January 2018 where Defendant voted to adopt those provisions.

The current published enforcement policy for taxis was not amended by the 3rd or 4th January 2018 when notices of suspension were served on the Claimant. In fact the latest version of the PDF file for the policy says it was created and last amended on the 24th December 2015. In fact it includes text (11.2 We will follow the Regulators Code…. See page ) which was only inserted into after the Council adopted the provisions on 2nd January 2018.

It is unlikely that the Defendant’s Officers had time to be trained on the new policy between 19:00 hours on the 2rd January 2018 and 13:00 hours on the 3rd January 2018 when the first Notice of Suspension was served (see page )


The Claimant has a right to continue using his hackney carriage until the Magistrates Court appeal is disposed of

Section 77 of the LGMPA Act (see page ) says

(2) If any requirement, refusal or other decision of a district council against which a right of appeal is conferred by this Act—

(a) involves the execution of any work or the taking of any action; or

(b) makes it unlawful for any person to carry on a business which he was lawfully carrying on up to the time of the requirement, refusal or decision;

then, until the time for appealing has expired, or, when an appeal is lodged, until the appeal is disposed of or withdrawn or fails for want of prosecution—

(i) no proceedings shall be taken in respect of any failure to execute the work, or take the action; and

(ii) that person may carry on that business.

As the purported hackney carriage vehicle suspension was unlawful and ultra vires and without proper notice the Court should order the Claimant to be allowed to use his hackney carriage, and without fear of the kind of reprisals by the Defendant set out in Mike Smith’s letter of 4th January 2018 (Paragraphs 4 to 6 of Page ) in the form of their suggested attack on his personal hackney carriage drivers license, and other penalties, till the appeal under section 47 of the LGMP Act is decided.

I believe that the facts stated in this claim form and statement of facts and grounds are true.

Signed [[Image:]]


Mark Guy Rostron


Draft Order


ORDER

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE Claim No.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Before The Honourable

Dated

Applicant: Mark Guy Rostron

Seal


Respondent: Guildford Borough Council, Millmead House, Millmead, Guildford, Surrey

GU2 4BB

Direct Telephone Number: 01483 505050 eMail: customerservices@guildford.gov.uk

THIS ORDER

  1. This is an Order to Stay the Defendents suspension of Claimant’s hackney carriage license, and
  2. To Order the Defendent to return the Claimant’s hackney carriage plate 68, and
  3. To Quash the Defenen’s decision to suspend the Claimant’s hackney carriage vehicle license.

made against the Respondent on [ ] by Mr Justice [ ] on the application of the Applicant.

2. This Order has effect until withdrawn by this Court.

3. This order was made on application by the Applicant without notice to the Respondent. The Respondent has a right to apply to the court to vary or discharge the order.

4. This order is effective against any Respondent on whom it is served or who is given notice of it.

PENAL NOTICE

IF YOU GUILDFORD BOROUGH COUNCIL DISOBEY THIS ORDER YOU MAY BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE IMPRISIONED, FINED OR HAVE YOUR ASSETS SEIZED.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS THE RESPONDENT TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY ALSO BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE IMPRISONED, FINED OR HAVE THEIR ASSETS SEIZED.

Anyone served with or notified of this order may apply to the court at any time to vary or discharge this order (or so much of it as affects that person), but they must first inform the Applicant. If any evidence is to be relied upon in support of the application, the substance of it must be communicated in writing to the Applicant in advance.

All communications to the court about this order should be sent to –

Administrative Court Office | Issues and Enquiries C324, Queen's Bench Division | HMCTS | Royal Courts of Justice| Strand, London | WC2A 2LL

Phone: 020 7947 6655 (Option 6) quoting the case number.

The offices are open between 10 a.m. and 4.30 p.m. Monday to Friday.

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