Letter before action s68

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Dear Sirs

For the attention of the legal department

This is a letter before action.

On the 3rd January at 13.45 a notice number 152 was served on me purporting to suspend this license for 

1 Breach of a purported licence condition that the vehicle be liveried

2 That my Meter/ Fare Chart was DEC 2013

The Officers decision to suspend was unlawful in that the licence condition had not been stipulated on a properly formed license and that if the condition were properly attached to my license then as it came into effect on the 1st January 2018, it would be appealed and that I had 21 days under section 47 of the Local Government Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1976 (LGMPA) to appeal it. The Officer was informed of that at the time of the alleged suspension.

The meter had been properly calibrated in December 2013 when the vehicle was first licensed. The Officer did not ask me when the fare chart had last been updated, but it had been updated on Friday 22nd December 2017 as required by Guildford Borough Council and as notified and acknowledged by you.

The Officer found no mechanical faults that made the vehicle unfit within the meaning of section 68 of the LGMPA.

If you do not withdraw this suspension by email by close of business today I will without further notice apply to the High Court for and emergency order that you do so at your expense.

The grounds are as follows, but not limited to:

  1. That there is no unfitness of the vehicle within the meaning of s68
  2. Suspension is a disproportionate action in the light of no risk to any members of the public, and is contrary to Councils enforcement policy
  3. Immediate suspension breaches my Human Right to the quiet enjoyment of my property. Part 2  Protocol 1, Article 1
  4. Immediate suspension breaches my rights in Article 6 for a fair hearing of the determination of my civil or criminal right.
  5. That the use of s68 is a deliberate abuse of process to attempt to deprive me of any right of appeal when appealable suspension was available to the Council under s60.
  6. That I nevertheless have such a right of appeal under s47 on the Act and further am allowed to continue working until the determination of that appeal.
  7. That I had the reasonable expectation that my right of appeal against any purported license condition would still be available or that I would not be prejudiced by any lack of it following the letter of John Martin.

Yours truly

Mark Rostron