Wilcock v Lancaster City Council 2013 LLR 607, Admin Ct
Button on Taxis:Licensing Practice and Law Nov 2017
Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal refused
Mrs Wilcock was not satisfied with that outcome, and made 2 attempts to have the matter considered by the Court of Appeal. The first (paper) application was refused, and then the matter was considered on an oral application by Maurice Kay LJ12 who introduced the judgment in the following terms13:
‘Mrs Wilcock is a Lancaster taxi driver. This momentous dispute relates to what the Council consider to be a breach of conditions attached to her licence.’
and he then determined the application14: ‘
4. In the court below Judge Waxman QC described the effect of section 68 in this way at paragraph 8:
“Under section 68 a licence for a vehicle can be suspended for no longer than two months and if the relevant matter is rectified before the end of that two-month period the suspension will end then. The suspension is not capable of extension. If not rectified and the two months have expired, it turns into a revocation which will then trigger a right of appeal as in under section 60.”
The grievance nurtured by Mrs Wilcock is that whereas there is an initial right of appeal following a suspension, revocation or refusal under section 60, there is no such right of appeal following a notice under section 68 although there is a right to apply for permission to seek judicial review.
5. A number of grounds of challenge were ventilated before Judge Waxman but today there is only one ground of appeal pursued by Ms Dring on behalf of Mrs Wilcock. It is the simple one of statutory interpretation. The submission is that in the circumstances which arose in this case, which did not deal with mechanical defects or road worthiness, the Council’s only power was to proceed under section 60, thereby triggering a right of appeal rather than under section 68.
6. In order to sustain such an argument, Ms Dring has to submit that “unfitness for use as a Hackney carriage” in section 60 is addressing something different from “fitness of the Hackney carriage” under section 68. Judge Waxman rejected that submission. In paragraph 33 of his judgment he said:
“What then is the interpretation of section 68 claim for (on behalf of Mrs Wilcock) there have been various formulations put forward but the essence is that where the word “fitness” appears in the second line of section 68 it should be read as “road worthiness” or, “suitable mechanical condition” or, if he is wrong about that, something rather wider but which in any event would not catch breach of a licence condition or perhaps not a breach of this licence condition. If that is right then, of course, the first point to make is that it is a construction which is radically narrower than the construction of a similar word which appears in section 60, a few sections earlier in the statute. Prima facie that would be odd in my view.”
In the following paragraphs he gave reasons why he was not going to perpetuate that oddity. When Lord Justice Davis refused permission to appeal he said:
“The judge’s interpretation of and approach to section 60 and section 68 seems to me plainly right.”
7. I have come to the same conclusion. It would be quite remarkable if the statute had been using “fitness” and “unfitness” by reference to a different hinterland in section 60 and section 68. In truth, section 60 and section 68 are simply two different powers which a council can use when the pre-conditions exist. Sometimes they will exist under both cases and it is a matter for judgment on behalf of the council as to which power they use. They are different in substance because section 68 is time limited to a maximum of two months but in fact, for obvious commercial and other reasons, will generally produce the desired results in a shorter time than that.
8. Section 60, as I have indicated, would involve in the present circumstances suspension and triggering of a right of appeal with interim relief pending appeal, which might go on for a considerable time and incur considerable expense.
9. I do not propose to say any more. I am satisfied that the judge was correct and I agree with Lord Justice Davis about this particular ground of appeal. I sense that it is being advanced as a kind of test case. We are now a considerable time down the road from when this dispute first arose. There have been parallel proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court which apparently came to an end after Judge Waxman’s decision, but I do not consider it necessary or appropriate to grant permission to get a decision from this court on a point on which the decision of the High Court seems to me to be correct and seems to have clarified whatever dispute exists in Lancaster or elsewhere about the Act. Accordingly,
I shall refuse permission.’
This is clear authority for the proposition that s 68 can be used wherever and whenever a vehicle is not only mechanically unfit, but where there is non-compliance with any of the conditions attached to that vehicle licence.
1[ 2013] LLR 607, Admin Ct.
2At para 23.
3See paras 24– 26.
4At para 27 onwards.
5Paragraphs 32– 46. 6Section 60( 1) states:
‘60 Suspension and revocation of vehicle licences (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Act of 1847 or in this Part of this Act, a district council may suspend or revoke, or (on application therefor under section 40 of the Act of 1847 or section 48 of this Act, as the case may be) refuse to renew a vehicle licence on any of the following grounds—
(a) that the hackney carriage or private hire vehicle is unfit for use as a hackney carriage or private hire vehicle;
(b) any offence under, or non-compliance with, the provisions of the Act of 1847 or of this Part of this Act by the operator or driver; or
(c) any other reasonable cause.’
7 See para 34.
8 See para 40 onwards.
9 This does not actually appear to be correct, as it is a transferable licence – see Chapter 2, para 2.109 onwards.
10 At para 57.
11 See paras 59 and 60.
12 [ 2014] LLR 388, CA.
13 At para 2.
14 Paragraphs 4– 9.
